On September 10, 2025, the Minnesota Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hoskin v. Krsnak, which plainly: (i) clarifies general notice pleading standards apply rather than the heightened code pleading standards that preceded the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, and (ii) once again rejects the “heightened” pleading standards applied in federal court.
The significance of Minnesota’s lower pleading standard manifests itself by the Minnesota’ Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that “plaintiff[s] face[] a lower burden to state a claim for relief and survive a motion to dismiss in Minnesota State Court than they would in federal court.” (Emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs Do Not Have To Plead Around Affirmative Defenses
In Minnesota state court it is now clear that “a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense may be granted only if the allegations in the complaint, construed in the plaintiff’s favor, establish an unrebuttable defense.”
In other words, “‘[o]nly when the plaintiff pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable defense—may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be dismissed’ for failure to state a claim.” Accordingly, a plaintiff’s complaint is not required to include facts that are sufficient to rebut a potential affirmative defense.
The mere presence of a potential affirmative defense is insufficient. Dismissal is appropriate “only when it is clear from the stated allegations in the complaint” that an affirmative defense bars the complaint.
Minnesota replaced code pleading with notice pleading in 1951 when it adopted Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01.
The Hoskin decision reinforces the Rule 8.01 standard that only a “short and plain statement” is required to survive a motion to dismiss. It rejects the prior code pleading standard that would have required a “potentially long, complex statement with allegations that not only set forth the plaintiff’s legal claims but also anticipate and rebut the defendant’s affirmative defenses” that may never be asserted.
Justice Procaccini, who wrote the Court’s unanimous decision, explained the burden rests on defendants:
[T]he defendant must show that the allegations in the complaint establish each element of an affirmative defense to secure dismissal based on that defense. This standard ensures that a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss unless the complaint itself sets forth the elements of an unrebuttable affirmative defense . . [.]
Minnesota Again Rejects the Federal Pleading Standard
The Supreme Court relied on case law from other jurisdictions, including case law from federal courts, in reaching its decision in Hoskin. But it nonetheless reiterated its prior rejection of the “heightened” pleading standard set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Iqbal and Twombly decisions requiring that a complaint contain facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief:
[T]he heightened [pleading] standard [of federal court] does not apply in Minnesota because our rules reflect “a preference for non-technical, broad-brush pleadings” that merely put the opposing party on notice of the claims against it.
Hoskin reinforces the need for vigilance by defendants in diligently removing cases to federal court where the heightened pleading standard may result in the dismissal of more cases at the Rule 12 motion to dismiss stage of proceedings.
Details from the Hoskin Case
In Hoskin, the plaintiff brough claims against defendants who were long time business partners. Plaintiff’s claims were based on several transfer agreements. Defendants brought a Rule 12 motion to dismiss arguing the release provisions in the transfer agreements released them from liability. Although the complaint did not reference the releases, or contain the word “release,” the trial court considered the transfer agreements because the complaint expressly referred to those agreements.
The trial court found in favor of defendants and granted the motion. It concluded that for plaintiff to avoid the effect of the releases in the transfer agreements on grounds of duress, plaintiff was required to plead facts demonstrating plaintiff had, or had attempted to, return the consideration received for signing the transfer agreements. Because no such facts had been pleaded, the complaint was dismissed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on different grounds. It concluded the trial court erred by determining plaintiff was required to return the consideration received to void the transfer agreements. Instead, it affirmed the trial court’s decision finding that plaintiff’s pleadings related to duress and fraud were insufficient to invalidate the releases. Specifically, the court of appeals reasoned the releases were fatal to plaintiff’s claims because the allegations in the complaint did not state a claim for duress or fraud and therefore could not invalidate the releases.
Plaintiff filed a petition for further review with the Supreme Court raising six grounds for review. Review was granted. But before after the initial briefing submitted by the parties, and before oral argument, the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on a “threshold issue” that it described as “dispositive.” Specifically, it requested supplemental briefing on “whether a plaintiff’s complaint must include facts sufficient to rebut a potential affirmative defense.”
Important Takeaways From The Hoskin Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision once again separates Minnesota from the federal courts and several state courts that apply the less permissive plausibility pleading standard. This may result in forum-shopping plaintiffs to select Minnesota as the venue for filing their lawsuits.
The Hoskin decision provides an incentive for plaintiffs’ counsel to file their cases in Minnesota state court rather than federal court because the Supreme Court made clear that the threshold for dismissal is “lower.” As a result, fewer cases will initially be filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. This may result in backlogs in state court and further delay case resolutions.
The continued application of notice pleading in Minnesota state court highlights the importance of timely removal to federal court. The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), generally provides defendants 30 days to remove cases to federal court. Given the decision in Hoskin, failure to timely remove an action now could mean the difference between having a case dismissed immediately pursuant to a Rule 12 motion in federal court, or having to bring a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment in state court after the conclusion of discovery.
Additionally, the Hoskin decision narrows the scope of cases in which affirmative defenses can be raised successfully in a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. On its face, Hoskin’s holding limits the utility of affirmative defenses as a basis for immediate dismissal to situations in which the complaint contains allegations, that when construed in plaintiff’s favor, establish an unrebuttable defense.
An open question remains, however, regarding whether a plaintiff may strategically refer to a document in a complaint (e.g., a contract) without attaching the document and still avoid dismissal based on an affirmative defense that can be unequivocally established by reference to portions of the document not mentioned in the complaint. A literal reading of the Hoskin decision indicates this may be the case. Such an application, though, would overturn significant precedent holding that courts may consider documents embraced by a complaint, that are central to a plaintiff’s claims, when deciding a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court in this case expressly considered the transfer agreements referred to (but not attached to) the complaint. But it did not rely on those transfer agreements to dismiss the complaint—thus leaving open the issue for a definitive determination in a future decision.